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FEAR AND LOATHING AND THE FORFEITURE LAWS
The trunk of the car looked like a mobile police narcotics lab. We
had two bags of grass, seventy-five pellets of mescaline, five sheets
of high-powered blotter acid, a salt shaker half full of cocaine, and
a whole galaxy of multi-colored uppers, downers, screamers,
laughers ... and also a quart of tequila, a quart of rum, a case of

Budweiser, a pint of raw ether and two dozen amyls.1
But this was before the Reagan Administration's war on drugs.
In 1988 the Reagan Administration began a new phase in its
war on drugs. The administration undertook a concerted demandside attack on the drug trade with the establishment of the zero tolerance policy. 2 Reinterpretation 3 of the drug forfeiture statute 4 to
penalize personal users was one of the weapons in this demand-side
attack. 5 This Note examines Section 881 of the statute on two
levels.
This Note first reviews the statute's application in terms of the
level of due process it affords. Generally, the level of due process
afforded a defendant or a claimant depends upon the nature of the
complaint. The courts have held that the forfeiture statute is quasicriminal. As a result, forfeiture claimants are entitled to a mixed
bag of criminal procedural protections.
This Note rejects as unprincipled the courts' characterization of
the statute as a quasi-criminal law. Instead this Note argues that the
statute is a criminal statute and concludes that claimants are entitled
to the same due process protections as criminal defendants.
The Note then considers the fairness of Section 881. The fairness evaluation includes a discussion of the statute's disproportionate effect, the courts' inability to mitigate harsh results, and the
unavailability of the laches defense. Ultimately the Note addresses
FEAR AND LOATHING IN LAs VEGAS 4 (1971).
Charles Rangel, Reagan's 'Zero Tolerance' Is a Zero Drug Policy, NEWSDAY, June 28,
1988, at 66 (editorial). The Bush Administration has pursued the attack with equal
vigor. See David Johnston, 119 Seized in Drive to Halt MarijuanaGrowing, N.Y. Times, Oct.
27, 1989, at A12, col. 1; SallyJohnson, Vermont PondersSpirit of Law on Drugs, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 24, 1989, at A18, col. 5.
s For a discussion of Congress's original intent and an outline of the statutory
forfeiture mechanism, see infra notes 33-47 and accompanying text.
4 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, § 511, 94 Stat. 1236, 1276 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)). All references hereinafter are made to the codified statute. As
the official supplement only dates to 1987, citation to an unofficial codification is made
when necessary to assure accuracy.
5
Rangel, supra note 2.
1
2

HUNTER S. THOMPSON,
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the fundamental unfairness of the statute and concludes that Congress should amend it to allow the courts more flexibility and to
prevent the prosecution of grossly disproportionate forfeitures.
I
BACKGROUND

A.

The History of the Zero Tolerance Policy

In early 1988, the Reagan Administration expanded its war on
drugs with the implementation of the so-called "zero tolerance"
policy, which targets the drug user as well as the dealer. 6 Prior to
the implementation of the zero tolerance policy, the government
primarily engaged in a supply-side attack on drugs, attempting to
interdict drugs before they reached the streets. Under zero tolerance, the Cabinet-level National Drug Policy Board made many proposals to discourage drug use. Among the proposals were
suspensions of the driver's licenses of convicted users, reduction of
federal college and housing subsidies to these users, and the forfeiture of any car or boat found to contain trace amounts of illegal
drugs. 7 Former Attorney General Meese implemented the zero tolerance proposal for forfeitures in March of 1988.8
Zero tolerance encourages government agents to seize an individual's property for violations of the drug laws. The statutory basis
for this policy is Section 881, which Congress passed in 1970. Section 881 permits forfeiture regardless of the quantity of drugs
found.9 In the first month and a half of the Reagan Administration's
program the government seized over twelve million dollars worth of
cars. 10 Additionally, the value of some of the seizures was grossly
disproportionate to the amount of drugs found: a 2.5 million dollar
yacht seized for less than one-tenth of an ounce of marijuana,"I a car
impounded when the air within it smelled of marijuana smoke, and a
car impounded for one-tenth of a gram of marijuana removed with
tweezers from the bottom of the driver's purse are just a few
examples. 12
6

Id.

7

Id.

Memorandum from Attorney General Edwin Meese, III, to all United States Attorneys 2 (March 30, 1988) (Combined Zero Tolerance/User) (on file at the Cornell Law
Review).
9 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1982); United States v. One 1976 Porsche 911S, 670 F.2d 810
(9th Cir. 1979); see United States v. One Clipper Bow Ketch Nisku, 548 F.2d 8 (1st Cir.
1977).
10 Jon Nordheimer, Tighter Federal Drug Dragnet Yields Cars, Boats and Protests, N.Y.
Times, May 22, 1988, at 1, col. 2.
11 Luxury Yacht is Seized with bit of Marijuana, N.Y. Times, May 8, 1988, at 16, col. 6.
12 Nordheimer, supra note 10.
8
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To understand the zero tolerance policy, it is first necessary to
understand the drug forfeiture statute.
B.

Forfeiture Laws
1. Origins of Forfeitures

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., argued in The Common Law that
modem forfeiture law is the last vestige of the common law deodand. 13 The deodand, a payment to the Crown by the owner of an
object that accidentally caused the death of another, represented the
assignment of liability without reference to culpability. 14 After examining several parallels, Holmes concluded that forfeitures were
an outgrowth of deodands. As deodands assign liability regardless
of guilt or innocence, an owner forfeits his ship in admiralty for customs violations, regardless of guilt. 15 Holmes noted that deodands
are usually imposed when the object (such as a falling tree or a runaway carriage)16 strikes and kills the victim, and concluded that the
object's "motion" creates the liability. With motion as a basis for
liability, Holmes attributed admiralty forfeiture to the motion of
ships through the water. 17 A few courts have wholeheartedly
adopted Holmes's armchair history.' 8
As will be shown below, however, this reading of Holmes's argument 19 is inaccurate; forfeiture laws arose independent of deodands. Finkelstein salvages Holmes's history of forfeitures by
20
arguing that forfeitures and deodands share several characteristics
and in retrospect represent similar responses to the significant
problems of their two different time periods. Finkelstein argues that
with the close of the medieval period, as the Crown became increas13

OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 25-30 (1923).

14 Jacob Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some HistoricalPerspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures,
Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 185, 249-50
(1973).
15 O.W. HOLMES, supra note 13, at 27-30. It should be noted that the modem forfeiture statute allows the government to condemn property without having to demonstrate that the owner was culpable. Lack of culpability does enter the picture, however,
as a possible defense. See infra text accompanying note 204.
16
17

O.W. HOLMES, supra note 13, at 25-26.
Id. at 26.

18 Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-81 (1974);
United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719-21 (1971); United
States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 872 n.3 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. One 1974 Cadillac El Dorado Sedan, 548 F.2d 421,424 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Schmalfeldt,
657 F. Supp. 385, 387-88 (W.D. Mich. 1987).
19 The thesis of The Common Law is that some modern statutes are living fossils of
older laws. Holmes argues that the form of the law stays the same through time, while
the rationale for the law changes. O.W. HOLMES, supra note 13, at 5.
20
Both deodands and forfeitures are the exclusive prerogative of the state, both
are actions in rem, and both are imposed regardless of the owner's state of mind. Finkelstein, supra note 14, at 251.
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ingly secular, modem forfeiture replaced deodands. 2 1 While the violent death of a human was considered an offense against God in
the earlier period, the non-payment of a customs duty can be seen
as an offense against the state in the later period. Both offenses required forfeiture of something of value.
Modem forfeiture law originated, independent of deodands,
during England's seventeenth-century maritime expansion. 22 In
this period, the admiralty courts and the common law courts fought
pitched jurisdictional battles because a wider jurisdiction resulted in
more potential clients. 23 Admiralty had one advantage over the
common law. Based on the same civil law code as the rest of the
European trading partners, it was the court of choice for international merchants. 24 Thus, admiralty had a vested interest in devel25
oping its procedures to curry the business of the merchant class.
The in rem proceeding, developed in the seventeenth century,
ranked high on the list of admiralty's procedural offerings. 2 6 The
merchant class liked the in rem proceeding because the "libelant
could proceed against property itself-the ship and its tackle-with
greater hope of compensation than in a suit at common law against
some impecunious master or partowner of the ship." 2 7 This in rem
proceeding developed to allow the forfeiture of ships as a penalty
when the owner tried to avoid paying customs duties.
This tradition of forfeiture in admiralty carried over to the New
World, 28 though not smoothly. When the Crown was unable to extract desired tariff payments through criminal sanctions via jury trials, it threatened the colonies with the use of forfeitures andjuryless
admiralty proceedings. 29 Although the Continental Congress complained about England's abuses of admiralty proceedings in the
Declaration of Independence, 3 0 the United States Congress had
21 Id.
22 Cf THOMAS SHOEMBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAw 11-16 (1987) (describing the rise of admiralty, and its procedures, during the rise of England to a great maritime power).
23 See United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 457 (7th Cir.
1980) (the court provides an excellent history of the forfeiture laws); Daniel Coquillette,
Legal Ideology andIncorporationI: The English Civilian Writers, 1523 - 1607, 61 B.U.L. REV. 1,
21-22 (1981).
24 George Steckley, Merchantsand the Admiralty Court During the English Revolution, 22
AM.J. LEGAL HIST. 137, 143, 151 (1978).
25 Id. at 171.
26

Id.

27 Id. At common law it was necessary to bring in personam suits against each of
the twenty or thirty part-owners of any ship. Id. at 151.
28 See, e.g., Sugar Act, 1764, 4 Geo. 3, ch. 15.
29 United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 457 (7th Cir.
1980); BARBARA W. TUCHMAN, THE MARCH OF FOLLY 146 (1984).

30

The Declaration of Independence para. 5 (U.S. 1776).
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fewer qualms about its own use of the procedure. Indeed, the fifth
statute passed by the first session of the United States Congress provided for forfeitures of ships when the owners did not pay customs
duties. 3 ' Today's forfeiture laws provide for the confiscation of vessels used in violation of the drug laws; they are the direct descendants of this early customs statute and they share many of the same
32
procedures.
2.

The Present Drug ForfeitureAct

In 1970, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and
Control Act, which provides for civil forfeiture for violations of the
drug laws.3 3 Because the forfeiture provision is only one small section in a much larger statute, the legislative history of this section is
not entirely clear. It is possible, however, to draw a few conclusions.
By placing forfeiture in the administrative penalties title rather than
in the criminal penalties title, one can infer that Congress intended
34
to assess a civil penalty through forfeiture.
Further, the legislative history illustrates that Congress intended this penalty to attach to drug dealers and not to drug users.
The legislative history states that the goal of the statute is to increase research, to penalize drug dealers, and to encourage drug
users to seek treatment. 35 Because no direct connection exists between seizure of users' cars and encouragement of drug rehabilitation, or between seizure of property and promotion of research, one
can conclude that the forfeiture section is intended as a penalty.
The statute's historical context supports this conclusion. The same
Congress enacted both the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act and the RICO statute, and both have similar forfeiture
mechanisms.3 6 RICO allows the government to seize property
purchased with money from organized crime. 3 7 The goal of RICO
31 See United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453, 461 (7th Cir.
1980); An Act to Regulate the Collection of Duties, ch. V, § 36, 1 Stat. 29, 47 (1789).
32 See One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d at 461. Compare An Act to Regulate the
Collection of Duties, ch. V, § 36, 1 Stat. 29, 47 (1789) (note the method of publication,
the burden of proof, the bond requirement, and the method of evaluating the value of
the forfeited items) with 21 U.S.C.A. § 881 (West 1981 & Supp. 1989) and 19 U.S.C.
§§ 1602-1618 (1982).
33 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (1970) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)). See supra note 4.
34 H.R. REP. No. 1444,91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4566, 4570-71.
35
H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4566.
36
See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1963, 84 Stat.
922, 943 (1970) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968 (1982)).
37
18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(a), 1963(a) (1982).
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is to hamper organized crime by taking away the tools of the trade.3 8
Drug forfeiture laws parallel RICO to the extent that they take away
property purchased with drug money39 and property that aids drug
smuggling. 40 Thus, the statute assesses forfeiture as a civil penalty
operating to deter drug dealing.
Section 881 codifies the drug forfeiture statute. The section
specifically subjects illegal drugs, their containers, the conveyances
that transported the drugs, money used in drug transactions, and
41
real property purchased with drug money to forfeiture.
The current statute creates an elaborate mechanism for forfeiture. First, the government may effect seizure through either an admiralty or statutory route. 4 2 Once a government agent has seized
property through either of the two routes, the agent must follow the
forfeiture process delineated in the customs laws. 4 3 The customs
laws provide for both summary and judicial forfeiture.4 4 In a summary forfeiture proceeding, the owner can either buy his or her
38 See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969). The committeejustified the
forfeiture as among much needed "new approaches that will deal not only with individuals, but also with the economic well being of the nation. In short, an attack must be
made on [the mob's] source of economic power itself, and the attack must take place on
all available fronts." Id.
39 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(6)-(7) (West 1981 & Supp. 1989) (property connected to
drugs).
40
Id. § 881(a)(3)-(4); see also S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191 (1984)
("More than ten years ago, the Congress recognized. .. [that] if law enforcement efforts
to combat racketeering and drug trafficking are to be successful, they must include an
attack on the economic aspects of these crimes. Forfeiture is the mechanism through
which such an attack may be made.").
41
21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(1)-(7) (West 1981 & Supp. 1989). The forfeited item's title
vests in the United States Government upon the item's use in violation of the drug laws.
Id. § 881(h) (West Supp. 1989). The government, however, is not required to immediately take possession of the item. See United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397 (4th Cir.
1982); United States v. One 1977 Mark V. Coupe, 643 F.2d 154 (3rd Cir. 1981).
42
21 U.S.C.A. § 881(b) (West 1981 & Supp. 1989). For a discussion of seizure
through the admiralty laws, see infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. For a discussion of seizure through the statutory mechanism, see infra notes 118-21 and accompanying text.
43
21 U.S.C.A. § 881(d) (West Supp. 1989). The customs laws first require the
agent to assess the domestic value of the item. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1606 (West Supp. 1989).
If the value of the property is less than one hundred thousand dollars, if the property is
contraband and per se illegal, or if the seized property is a conveyance, then the government can proceed by summary forfeiture, but the claimant may request judicial forfeiture. Id. § 1607. Summary forfeiture requires the government to publish a notice of
forfeiture, and to mail a notice if the owner is known. Id. Within twenty days of publication of the first notice, the owner must file a claim and post a bond for a portion of the
value. Id. § 1608. The owner can then pay for the property or begin ajudicial forfeiture
proceeding. Id. §§ 1608, 1614. If no bond is posted, then the property is sold at a
public auction. Id. § 1608. If the forfeited item is not a conveyance and it is worth more
than one hundred thousand dollars, then the government must initiate judicial forfeiture. Id. § 1610.
44 Id. §§ 1607, 1608; see supra note 43.
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property back from the government, or demand a judicial forfeiture
proceeding. 4 5 In a judicial forfeiture proceeding, the government
must first prove that probable cause justified the forfeiture. Upon
such proof, the burden shifts to the claimant to prove his or her
innocence. 4 6 Regardless of whether the property undergoes summary or judicial forfeiture, the individual can seek remission or miti47
gation from the Attorney General.
II
Is SECTION

881

CONSITrUTIONAL?

The constitutional due process implications of Section 881 depend on the statute's characterization as either a civil or a criminal
law. Procedural protections afforded claimants hinge on this characterization. This section first discusses whether 21 U.S.C. § 881 is
civil or criminal and then examines the constitutional safeguards
that should attach to the statute. Finally, it analyzes the protections
that courts have given to forfeiture claimants.
A.

Is Section 881 Civil or Criminal?
1. The Civil/Criminal Test in the Abstract

In Helvering v. Mitchell,48 the Supreme Court first developed the
theoretical groundwork for evaluating whether a statute is civil or
criminal. The government charged the defendant in Mitchell with
tax fraud and attempted to penalize him through a civil fine.4 9 The
Court stated that to determine whether a statute is criminal or civil,
courts should strive to determine whether the congress meant to
create a criminal or a civil penalty.5 0 This holding expressed enormous deference to Congress and could have resulted in a complete
abdication of the courts' role as the guardian of the Constitution. 5 1
Indeed, the Court proclaimed this seemingly limitless deference to
Congress in Mitchell despite noting that the statute under conisideration resulted in a "comparative[ly] sever[e]" penalty. 5 2 Congress
45
46

See supra note 43.
19 U.S.C.A. § 1615 (West 1981 & Supp. 1989).

47

Id § 1618. Traditionally, depending on the legal framework of the forfeiture,

the claimant sought remission or mitigation through the Secretary of the Treasury (if

under the customs law) or the Secretary of Commerce (if under the navigation laws).
Congress modified this, and now remission or mitigation is generally sought through
the Attorney General. 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1982).
48 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
49 Id at 395-96.
50 Id. at 399.
51 Under this limitless test, Congress conceivably could have enacted any statute
and characterized it as civil in order to bypass all of the due process protections that the

Constitution requires in criminal cases.
52

Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 400.
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never tested the limits of Mitchell, however, and the Court revised
the test in two subsequent decisions.
The Court trimmed the broad holding of Mitchell in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez.53 At issue in Mendoza-Martinez was the defendant's
due process protection when the government sought to deprive him
of his United States citizenship after he left the country to escape
the draft during World War II. To resolve this question, the Court
created a two-part test for determining whether a statute is civil or
criminal. The first prong requires the court to examine whether
4
Congress intended to enact a civil statute.M
If the court concludes that Congress intended to enact a civil
statute, the court then determines whether Congress could constitutionally characterize the statute as civil. According to Mendoza-Martinez, this examination involves weighing seven factors: first,
whether the statute creates an affirmative disability or restraint; second, whether the underlying behavior has been historically punished as a crime; third, whether the statute requires scienter; fourth,
whether the statute promotes retribution and/6r deterrence; fifth,
whether the underlying behavior is currently a crime; sixth, whether
there is an alternative, non-penal purpose behind the law; and seventh, whether the law is well-tailored to its non-penal purpose. 55
Instead of directly applying the Mendoza-Martinez test when an
opportunity presented itself seventeen years later, the Court reformulated the Mitchell test in United States v. Ward.5 6 The defendant in
Ward challenged the constitutionality of a statute that assessed a civil
penalty for polluting navigable waters. The Ward Court retained the
first part of the Mendoza-Martinez test, which examined the congressional intent, but it created a variation of the second prong of the
test.

57

The second part of the Ward test replaced the seven MendozaMartinez factors and instead examined whether the statutory penalty
is so punitive that the law should be considered criminal. If the penalty is so punitive, the court should negate Congress's intention to
enact a civil statute. However, "only the clearest proof" that the
penalty is too harsh is sufficient to override this Congressional intent.58 Therefore, the second part of the Ward test is much more
deferential to Congressional will than the Mendoza-Martinez seven-

55

372 U.S. 144 (1963).
Id. at 169.
Id at 168-69.

56
57
58

448 U.S. 242 (1980).
Id. at 248-49.
Id.

53
54
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factor test. Yet Ward has not totally supplanted Mendoza-Martinez,59
and courts seem to treat the two tests as alternatives, notwithstand60
ing the possibility that they may yield different results.
2.

Courts Have Not ProperlyApplied the Civil/Criminal.Tests to
ForfeitureLaws

The Court has not been consistent in its application of either
the Mendoza-Martinez or the Ward test to the forfeiture laws. Instead,
the Court has held several times that forfeiture laws are quasi-criminal-criminal for certain constitutional provisions, and civil for
others. 6 ' It is difficult to justify this quasi-criminal characterization
62
in any principled fashion.
The Court has not explained how it can distinguish among the
different criminal due process provisions, preserving some while
discarding others. 63 Instead of striving for consistency by coherently applying either the Mendoza-Martinez test or the Ward test, the
Court has adjudicated forfeiture cases in an ad hoc fashion. With
each case the Court must decide whether the quasi-criminal statute
is sufficiently similar to a criminal statute to justify awarding the
claimant the constitutional protection he or she seeks.
This analysis is problematic because the Constitution does not
create a hierarchy among the various rights provided to a criminal
defendant. The American constitutional scheme does not place the
right to avoid self-incrimination, for example, above the right to
avoid double jeopardy. Rather, all criminal defendants are entitled
59 See United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362-66 (1984)
(applying the Mendoza-Martinez seven factor test to the second prong of the Ward test).
60 Compare infra text in Section II(A)(3)(a) with infra text in Section II(A)(3)(b). This
lack of preference for either test can be seen in the failure of Ward to recognize that the
new test might yield different results than the Mendoza-Martinez test. The Court indicated that it was merely restating the Mendoza-Martinez factors, implying that the Ward
test is the same as the older test. Ward, 448 U.S. at 249.
61 See, e.g., One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
62 Additionally, there is no constitutional textual support for quasi-criminal actions.
The Constitution speaks of criminal actions and common law actions, but does not speak
of hybrid actions. Although I have few reservations with an expansive interpretation of
the Constitution, the Court is on its firmest footing when it reasonably interprets the
language of the Constitution to update it in light of contemporary mores and to further
personal liberties. Here, the Court has avoided the constitutional interpretation; there
is no evidence that contemporary mores cry out for a quasi-criminal action, and this
Note argues that the quasi-criminal status of forfeitures harms personal liberties.
63 The Court has examined each facet of due process on a piecemeal basis. See
United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391
(1938); Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Consequently, it has begged the bigger question
of why some due process provisions are applicable to a given law while other provisions
are not.
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to fundamental criminal procedures "necessary to an Anglo-American regime of ordered liberty." 64 If a court determines that a particular forfeiture statute is criminal in nature, the defendant should be
awarded the entire bundle of constitutional rights due a criminal
defendant.
On the other hand, if the court determines that the forfeiture
statute is civil, then the claimant is not entitled to the same due process rights as a criminal defendant, and the court is engaging in unjustifiable activism by awarding such rights to the civil claimant.
This activism is less justifiable than the court rulings that expanded
criminal procedure in the 1960s and 1970s since here there is no
textual grounding for the rights; 65 civil parties are traditionally enti66
tled to little more than a fair hearing.
Quasi-criminal statutes, therefore, either unconstitutionally deprive criminal defendants of their due process rights or unjustifiably
afford civil claimants too many rights. A principled analysis of the
forfeiture laws would apply the Mendoza-Martinez test or the Ward
test to the specific statute and then characterize the statute as either
criminal or civil in its applications.
3.

Courts Should CharacterizeSection 881 as Criminal

The first part of both the Mendoza-Martinez and the Ward tests
requires the examination of Congressional intent. 6 7 The legislative
history of Section 881 indicates that Congress intended to enact a
civil statute. 68 Therefore, the analysis of whether Section 881 is
crimiral turns on the second part of both tests, where the courts
must weigh the criminal aspects of the statute. By balancing the
seven factors of the Mendoza-Martinez test, courts should negate
Congress's intent and characterize Section 881 as criminal. Furthermore, even the Ward test suggests that the court should nullify Con69
gress's intention to create a civil statute in some individual cases.
a. The Application of the Mendoza-Martinez Test to Section
881.
The second part of the Mendoza-Martinez test requires evaluation of the given statute in light of seven factors. 70 The court may
64
65
66

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150 n.14 (1968).
See supra note 62.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950);JAcK H.
FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE, ARTHUR MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.21, at 172 (1985).
67 See supra text accompanying notes 54 & 57.
68 See supra text accompanying note 34.
69 The Ward test does not provide a uniform standard because it essentially requires an ad hoc analysis. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
70 See infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
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overrule Congress's intent to create a civil statute if after balancing
the seven factors it finds the statute to be sufficiently criminal in
nature.
A court would first ask whether 21 U.S.C. § 881 creates an affirmative disability. Mendoza-Martinez does not clearly define what
constitutes an affirmative disability. 7 1 Is it the mere prohibition of a
specific legal act? Or is it the imposition of an economic, social, or
physical harm? The forfeiture statute prohibits a legal act when the
government prohibits owners from claiming title to forfeited property. Alternatively, the government's seizure of forfeited property
directly imposes harm on property owners by depriving them of
their property rights. Thus, under either definition, Section 881
creates an affirmative disability.
The second factor of the Mendoza-Martinez test, whether the underlying behavior has historically been punished as a crime, is
clearly met. Drug possession has been a crime since the late nine72
teenth century.
The third factor examines whether the statute has a mental
state requirement. 73 Although 21 U.S.C. § 881 does not require the
government to prove mens rea, mental state is a vital component in
proving lack of negligence, a possible defense that vessel owners
can assert.74 Thus, forfeiture is conditioned on the claimant's inability to prove an innocent mens rea.
The fourth factor asks whether the law promotes retribution or
deterrence, which would make the offence more criminal than civil.
71
A disability is usually defined as a restraint that prevents an individual from enjoying "ordinary legal rights." BLACK'S LAw DIcTioNARY 415 (5th ed. 1979). The Court,
however, seems to use the term in a much narrower sense, perhaps equating it to what
Black's refers to as a special disability that "debars [the individual] from [performing]
one specific act." Id. The Mendoza-Martinez Court cites two cases to help define affirmative disability; both of the cases involve a special disability. See United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303, 316 (1945) (World War II era statute ordering the firing of several members of the executive branch suspected of being communists was struck down as a criminal statute that did not incorporate the necessary due process protections); Ex parte
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1866) (a post civil war statute preventing members
of the confederacy who had yet to take a loyalty oath from being hired by the federal
government was struck down for being a criminal statute and violating the prohibition
on bills of attainder).
72
One of the earliest statutes dealt with Chinese Opium. See Act of Feb. 23, 1887,
ch. 210, 24 Stat. 409, repealedby Pub. L. No. 91-513, Title III, § 1 101(a)(1), 84 Stat. 1291
(1970).
73
The model penal code lists four levels of scienter: purposely, knowingly, recklessly, and negligently. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (2) (1962).
74 See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974) ("[I]t
would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim of an owner... who proved not only
that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful activity, but also that he had
done all that reasonably could be expected to prevent the proscribed use of his
property.").
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At the very least, Congress intended Section 881 to deter drug
smuggling by taking away a tool of the smugglers. 75 Likewise, some
retributional goals are met when the government takes the property
of the smugglers.
The fifth factor examines whether the underlying behavior is
currently a crime. This factor also argues for overriding Congress's
intent to create a civil statute, since the underlying behavior of drug
possession can be prosecuted as a crime.
Although the first five factors of the Mendoza-Martinez test suggest that the courts should override Congress's intent, the last two
factors may suggest otherwise. The sixth factor asks whether an alternative, non-penal purpose to the law exists. The purpose of the
forfeiture law is not merely to inflict damages upon the drug runners. The long-term goal is to stymie drug smuggling by taking
smugglers' vessels and money. 76 The existence of a non-penal purpose in Section 881, however, should not control the outcome of
the analysis. Because nearly every criminal statute has an alternative
non-penal purpose, 77 this factor does not effectively discriminate
between those statutes which should be considered civil and those
which should be considered criminal.
The seventh factor asks whether the law creates a penalty that is
well-tailored to the alternative non-penal goals. If the penalty is
poorly-tailored to the alternative non-penal goals, then perhaps
these goals are not the real aim of the statute. The question of fit
can be analyzed on two levels. First, examined on a societal level,
one would likely conclude that Section 881 is well-tailored to the
non-penal goal expressed above. This conclusion depends, however, upon the assumptions that fighting drugs is among America's
highest national priorities, and that forfeitures have some deterrent
effect on drug smuggling. Thus analyzed, the law is well-tailored
because the resulting marginal gain in such an important struggle
validates Section 881.
The means-end fit can also be analyzed on an individual level.
When the government executes its aggressive zero tolerance policy,
small scale users forfeit property in amounts disproportionate to the
severity of their actions. 78 For example, two individuals caught with
the same amount of marijuana would be penalized to vastly different
degrees if one individual was found on board his million dollar
75
76

See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
Seeid

Murder statutes can be said to promote the alternative non-penal purpose of
peacefulness by dissuading would-be murderers. And yet, no one would argue that the
statute is civil.
78
See supra text accompanying note 11-12.
77
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yacht and the other was driving his 1973 Ford Pinto. Even if the
forfeitures accomplish the non-penal purpose of encouraging the
claimants to stop using drugs, the statute is not well-tailored on an
individual level because the benefit to society of convincing the
yacht owner to give up using marijuana does not justify the million
dollar penalty. Section 881 can only be well-tailored to its non-penal purpose when the government uses it to implement Congress's
original policy of attacking drug suppliers. These suppliers are
more likely to be caught with large amounts of drugs and they pose
a greater threat to society.
Although the last two factors may suggest that the courts
should respect Congress's intent, the factors must be examined
within the context of the entire seven factor equation. Mendoza-Martinez does not require courts to use the seven factors as a checklist.
Instead, it encourages them to weigh the factors and thereby determine whether the statute in question is really criminal despite its
civil label. Unlike the Ward test, the Mendoza-Martinez test does not
require a court to show great deference to congressional intent.
Viewing the Mendoza-Martinez factors, the courts should treat Section 881 as a criminal statute.
b. Application of the Ward Test to Section 881.
Even the Ward test, which is more deferential to Congress, suggests that the courts should sometimes nullify Congress's intention
to create a civil statute. The Ward test asks whether the penalty is so
punitive as to negate Congress's intention to enact a civil statute.
The analysis in Ward hinges upon the penalty's severity. Penalties in
forfeiture cases are case-specific because the forfeiture's severity depends upon the value of the forfeited property. Thus, in those cases
where the value of the forfeited property is greatly disproportionate
to the underlying behavior, a court could negate Congress's intent.
The Ward test, however, may be inadequate for forfeitures. Particularly problematic is the impossibility of drawing a bright line
rule delineating when any given forfeiture is disproportionate.
Under Ward, before each trial on the merits, a court must adjudicate
the proportionality question to determine the applicable due process standard. 79 The Mendoza-Martinez test, on the other hand,
needs to be litigated only once to determine the standard for every
case brought under the statute. And therefore, at least in the case of
79 This problem is unique to forfeiture since there are two variables: the value of
the forfeited property and the amount of drugs. This problem is not present in most
other cases where the penalty is statutorily imposed and the only variable is the degree
of harm. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980).
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forfeiture, courts should apply only the Mendoza-Martinez test and
not the Ward test.
B.

Quasi-Criminal Laws and Due Process

Civil parties are afforded much less due process than criminal
defendants. If a civil plaintiff brings a non-frivolous suit to a court
of proper jurisdiction, the court can resolve the case on the merits
using the applicable rules of civil procedure and evidence. Each
party is entitled to a fair hearing and little more.8 0
For criminal defendants, on the other hand, the parameters of
due process are much broader. Criminal defendants are entitled to
many constitutional safeguards: the state must give prior notice of
the crime via a properly enacted and published statute;8 1 the state
cannot shift certain elements of the state's case onto the defend83
ant;8 2 the statute must normally contain a mens rea requirement;
the prosecutor cannot force the defendant to testify against himself;8 4 and the prosecutor cannot use evidence against the defendant
if the state obtains it in violation of the defendant's fourth amend85
ment rights.
Because courts presently view claimants in forfeiture actions as
neither purely civil nor purely criminal parties but as parties to a
quasi-criminal action, the courts have awarded the claimants a
hodgepodge of rights.8 6 For example, in Boyd v. United States,8 7 the
Supreme Court created an exception to the usual rule that the fifth
amendment is inapplicable to civil actions.8 8 The Court recognized
that although Congress characterized forfeitures as civil actions,
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
81 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (Congress shall pass no ex post facto laws); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (the states shall pass no ex post facto laws).
82 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
83 See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
84 U.S. CONST. amend. V (self-incrimination clause).
85 See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
86 See United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas, Inc., 829 F.2d 532, 540 (5th Cir. 1987)
("It is true that forfeiture statutes like Section 881 have been considered criminal for
certain purposes .... However, for other purposes, the civil nature of forfeiture procedures has been held to bar the application of important constitutional protections.")
(citation omitted), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1270 (1988).
87 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
88 As a general rule, civil parties can always be called by their opponent to testify.
The major exception to this general rule is evidentiary privileges. See J. FRIEDENTrHAL,
M. KANE, A. MILLER, supra note 66, § 7.4. Parties to civil actions are not entitled to
invoke the protections of the fifth amendment merely to avoid civil damages. The fifth
amendment is specifically designed to avoid criminal liability and can only be invoked in
a civil trial if the line of questioning concerns a subject involving potential criminal penalties. Any civil party who refuses to answer the queries of an opponent without invoking a privilege in good faith is ordinarily subject to contempt and other penalties. See
Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d 209, 216 (1st Cir. 1954).
80
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these actions had distinct criminal characteristics.8 9 Therefore, forfeiture claimants can invoke the fifth amendment not only to protect
against any future criminal actions, but also to protect their property
from forfeiture. For purposes of the self-incrimination clause, forfeitures are criminal actions.
With Boyd as a comparison we turn to other procedural rights.
It is difficult to draw a principled distinction between Boyd's outright
grant of fifth amendment protection and the Court's less generous
treatment of several other criminal procedure rights.
1. Due Process Rights That the Courts Do Not Award the Claimant
in a Quasi-CriminalForfeitureAction
The Supreme Court, in In re Winship,90 read the due process
clause to require the prosecution to prove "beyond a reasonable
doubt... every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he
is charged." 9 1 At a forfeiture hearing, however, the government
need only make a showing of probable cause that the claimant's
property is subject to forfeiture. 92 Once the prosecution proves its
case by a preponderance of the evidence, 98 claimants then have the
burden to establish their innocence by proving that they actually
were not carrying drugs or that they lacked the necessary mens
rea.

94

If Section 881 were a criminal statute, these burdens of proof in
a forfeiture action would be unconstitutional for three reasons.
First, the prosecution must only meet a preponderance of the evidence standard, 9 5 which clearly violates the Winship requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Second, even though the legislative history of Section 881 indicates that the prosecution should prove a connection between the
forfeited item and a violation of the drug laws, 96 two circuits have
89

Boyd, 116 U.S. at 634.

90

397 U.S. 358 (1970).

91

Id. at 364.
See supra text accompanying note 46.
93 The courts have uniformly held that the government must show probable cause
by the preponderance of the evidence standard. See, e.g., United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V, 453 F. Supp. 1388 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
94 19 U.S.G.A. § 1615 (West 1981 & Supp. 1989) ("the burden of proof shall be
upon the defendant"). Claimants can successfully contest the forfeiture by establishing
that they acted non-negligently. See infra text accompanying note 204.
95 19 U.S.G.A. § 1615 (West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
96 The legislative history states that "due to the penal nature of forfeiture statutes,
it is the intent of these provisions that property would be forfeited only if there is a
substantial connection between the property and the underlying criminal activity which
the statute seeks to prevent." 124 CoNG. REc. 34,671 (1978) (joint House-Senate explanation of Senate amendment).
92
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held that the government is not required to make such a showing. 97
These rulings allow the prosecution to avoid proving every element
of its case as required by the second half of the Winship holding.
Third, the statute unconstitutionally shifts an essential element
of the prosecution's case onto the claimant by making the lack of
negligence, one of the levels of mens rea, an affirmative defense.
The Supreme Court affirmed, in Mullaney v. Wilbur,9 8 that the state
cannot shift the burden of proof of any essential element of a crime
to the criminal defendant. Since United States v. United States Gypsum
Co. held that mens rea is an essential element of most crimes, 99 one
might conclude that the respective burdens of proof are unconstitutional. Yet every court of appeals that has ruled upon this shifting
of the elements of proof in forfeiture actions has concluded that this
shift is acceptable because the action is quasi-criminal.1 0 0
The state's ability to shift the burden of proof in a forfeiture
action is only one limit on forfeiture claimants' due process rights.
For example, although the state cannot usually bring a second criminal action for the same incident against the same defendant after the
first action fails, the Supreme Court has held that the bringing of a
forfeiture action after a failed criminal prosecution is not double
jeopardy.' 0 ' Additionally, two circuits have held that property can
be forfeited under Section 881 for illegal behavior that occurred
prior to the passage of the law because the ex post facto clause does
10 2
not apply to quasi-criminal actions.
2. Due Process Rights That the Forfeiture Claimants Receive to a
Lesser Extent Than Criminal Defendants
Although forfeiture claimants are denied many basic due process rights, the courts, recognizing that the forfeiture action shares
many of the indicia of a criminal proceeding, have given claimants
97 United States v. $5,644,540.00 in United States Currency, 799 F.2d 1357 (9th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-five Thousand Dollars,
762 F.2d 895 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056 (1986).
98 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
99 With a few narrowly circumscribed exceptions, "mens rea is the rule of, rather
than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence."
United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,436 (1978) (quoting Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 500 (1951)).
100 United States v. $250,000 in United States Currency, 808 F.2d 895 (1st Cir.
1987); United States v. $2,500 in United States Currency, 689 F.2d 10, 12 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 1099 (1984); United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 529
F.2d 65, 66 (9th Cir. 1976); Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968, 973 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1069 (1974).
101 See Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577 (1931).
102
United States v. D.K.G. Appaloosas, Inc., 829 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 976 (1988); United States v. 5,644,540.00 in United States Currency, 799
F.2d 1357 (9th Cir. 1986).
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many due process rights reserved for criminal defendants. But the
courts have failed to expand these very rights to keep them symmetrical with the rights of criminal defendants.
a.

The Right to a Jury Trial.

Two constitutional amendments guarantee the right to a jury
trial. The sixth amendment guarantees all criminal defendants the
"right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury."' 0 3 The
seventh amendment guarantees all civil claimants in suits at common law the right to ajury trial if the amount in controversy exceeds
twenty dollars. 0 4 In some cases, forfeiture proceedings can sidestep these two amendments. Since courts characterize the proceedings as quasi-criminal, and because the actions can be brought in
admiralty, the proceedings are neither clearly criminal and governed by the sixth amendment, nor actions at common law governed by the seventh amendment.
The government may commence a forfeiture action either by
seizing the property through the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Supplemental Rules for Admiralty Rule C or by seizing it through
one of the statutory mechanisms enumerated in Section 881.105 If
the government elects to bring the action through Rule C, the court
is sitting in admiralty;' 06 if the government chooses the latter mechanisms, the court is sitting at common law.' 0 7 The seventh amendment not only fails to guarantee the right of ajury trial to parties to
an admiralty suit, but Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38(e) specifically denies admiralty claimants the right to a jury trial.
The denial of ajury trial in admiralty suits borders on injustice
when we consider that the government need not be consistent in its
decisions to commence actions in admiralty or at common law.
Only the owner who is fortunate to have his or her property seized
through the statutory mechanisms is entitled to a jury trial.
To remedy some of the inequities caused by denial of a jury
trial, the seventh circuit has held that if the government uses the
rules of admiralty to bring a seizure on land, the court will treat the
case as having been brought to a common-law court and will grant a
jury trial.' 0 8 This holding, however, does not address the right of a

104
105

U.S. CONST.amend. VI.
U.S. CONsT. amend. VII.
21 U.S.C.A. § 881(b)(l)-(4) (West 1981 & Supp. 1989).

106

FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h).

103

107 When the government seizes the property through the statutory mechanism, the
claimant is entitled to a jury trial. It is undear, however, whether the jury trial is available because the action is at common law or because forfeitures are criminal.
108 United States v. One 1976 Mercedes Benz 280S, 618 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1980).
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claimant to request a jury trial when the claimant's ship or boat was
forfeited at sea and the court is sitting in admiralty.
Another dimension of the right to a jury trial that the courts
have not addressed is the constitutionality of granting the government a directed verdict. In a criminal trial, the jury must decide
every question of fact; the prosecution cannot move for a directed
verdict.109 The forfeiture statutes imply that the government can
move for a directed verdict. 1 10 No federal court, however, has ruled
on the right of a forfeiture claimant to have all of the facts tried by a
jury.
b. Fourth Amendment Protections.
The Supreme Court has held that forfeiture seizures must comply with the fourth amendment's restrictions on unreasonable
searches and seizures.' However, the courts have not applied the
fourth amendment to forfeiture cases as broadly as they have applied the amendment to criminal cases.
(i) Mechanisms for Seizures within the Forfeiture Laws
As discussed above, 1 12 Section 881 allows the government to
choose between two basic mechanisms for seizing property: the
general rules of admiralty 133 and the specific statutory provisions of
the forfeiture laws."14
If the government elects to seize the property under the general
rules of admiralty, it may resort to a seizure in rem.115 The government initiates the seizure by filing a complaint, which must state at a
minimum: where the property is to be seized; whether the property
is on land or on the sea; and any other allegations required by the
forfeiture statute. 116 If the complaint is duly made out and sworn
to, then "the clerk... shall forthwith issue a summons and warrant
...without requiring a certificate of exigent circumstances."'' 17
109 United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am. v. United States, 330 U.S. 395,
408 (1947).
110
The customs laws place the burden of proof on the claimant, 19 U.S.G.A. § 1615
(West 1981 & Supp. 1989), which implies that should the claimant not meet the burden

of persuasion, the government would win by default. The customs laws also allow for
summary forfeiture, id. § 1607, which allows the government to win without a hearing in
certain cases. See supra note 43.
111 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965) (state forfeiture
laws); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (federal forfeiture laws).
112
See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
113 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(b) (West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
114 Id. § 881(b)(1)-(4).
115 FED. R. Crw. P. Supp. R. ADMIR. & MAR.CLAIMS C(1).
116 Id. at C(2). 21 U.S.C.A. § 881 (West 1981 & Supp. 1989), does not require any
other allegations.
117

FED. R. Crv. P. SupP. R. ADMIR. & MAR. CLAIMS C(3).
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On the other hand, to follow the statutory seizure mechanisms
under Section 881, the government must meet one of four conditions: the seizure must be incident to a search warrant, arrest warrant or an arrest;"18 the seizure must be justified by a lien imposed
because of a prior judgment in favor of the government;1 19 the Attorney General must have probable cause to believe that the item to
be forfeited is dangerous to the public's health or welfare; 120 or the
Attorney General must have probable cause to believe that the forfeited item is subject to civil forfeiture.' 2 1
(ii) The Admiralty Mechanism Circumvents the Fourth
Amendment Warrant Requirement
The Supreme Court has interpreted the fourth amendment to
require that a neutral and detached magistrate examine all warrant
applications.1 22 However, Supplemental Rule C allows a clerk to issue the warrant. 23 Rule C is constitutional only if a clerk qualifies
as a magistrate.
The Supreme Court held in Shadwick v. City of Tampa' 24 that, in
order to be constitutionally qualified as a magistrate, the issuer of a
warrant must meet two requirements: the magistrate must be neutral and independent of the officers who request the warrant, and
the magistrate must be capable of determining whether probable
cause exists for the particular search or arrest warrant. 12 5 Although
clerks in admiralty proceedings may fulfill the first requirement,
they cannot conform to the second requirement because the statute
structurally prevents clerks from making a probable cause determination.' 26 Clerks are also practically incapable of making a probable
cause determination because they usually lack the training of a
27
judge.'
The courts which have examined the admiralty rules in light of
the magistrate requirement have disagreed on the rules' constitutionality. The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue, but
118

119
120
121
122

21 U.S.C. § 881(b)(1) (1982).
Id. § 881(b)(2).
Id. § 881(b)(3).
21 U.S.C.A. § 881(b)(4) (West 1981 & Supp. 1989).

See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984); Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New
York, 442 U.S. 319, 326 (1979); Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972).
123
FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. ADMIR. & MAR. CLAIMS C(3).
124
407 U.S. 345 (1972).
125
Id. at 350.
126 FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. ADMIR. & MAR. CLAIMS C(3).
127
United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V Coupe, 643 F.2d 154 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981) (the court stated that the admiralty procedure was minimal,
citing with approval United States v. Pappas, 613 F.2d 324 (1979) (CampbellJ., concurring) (discussing the inability of clerks to conduct proximate cause determinations)).
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several district courts and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit have addressed it.128 The district courts have concluded that
the clerk is not a detached and neutral magistrate for a variety of
reasons: the clerk is not a judicial officer; the clerk can only rubberstamp the complaint and issue a warrant; and the complaint contains
only conclusory allegations and not the information necessary for a
probable cause hearing.' 29 The Eleventh Circuit, on the other
hand, held that review by a magistrate was unnecessary.' 3 0 The
court reasoned that because the Supreme Court held in Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 151 that the Constitution does not require
a pre-seizure hearing in a forfeiture action, the inadequacies of the
admiralty warrant process are irrelevant. Any process is more process than the minimum constitutional requirements. As analyzed
below,1 3 2 this reading of Calero-Toledo is erroneous. Pre-seizure
hearings should be required in some cases and in those cases the
magistrate requirement of the fourth amendment should be met.
Additionally, the admiralty mechanism does not provide a preseizure hearing. Both the due process clause and the warrant clause
mandate a pre-seizure hearing.13 3 The analysis of the two clauses is
similar in several critical respects. Both clauses strive to minimize
the chance of a wrongful deprivation of property by requiring some
34
form ofjudicial supervision.'
The landmark case of Fuentes v. Shevin 13 5 established that the
due process clause requires a judicial pre-seizure hearing before a
creditor can invoke the state apparatus for attaching a debtor's
property.' 3 6 The Court reasoned that, regardless of the administra128
United States v. A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625 (11th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Real Property Located at 25231 Mammoth Circle, 659 F. Supp. 925
(C.D. Cal. 1987); United States v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 647 F. Supp. 732 (W.D.N.C.
1986); Application of Kingsley, 614 F. Supp. 219 (D. Mass. 1985); United States v. Certain Real Estate Property, 612 F. Supp. 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
129 25231 Mammoth Circle, 659 F. Supp. at 927; Life Ins. Co. of Va., 647 F. Supp. at
741; Application of Kingsley, 614 F. Supp. at 222-23; Certain Real Estate Property, 612 F.
Supp. at 1495.
130
A Single Family Residence, 803 F.2d at 631.
131
416 U.S. 663 (1974).
132
See infra notes 140-50 and accompanying text.
133
See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972) (due process clause); United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 917 (1984) (fourth amendment warrant clause).
134
Compare LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTUTIONAL LAW § 10.7, at 666-67
(2d ed. 1988) (the due process clause is designed to minimize wrongful takings) with
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15 (1948) (neutral and detached magistrate
reviewing warrant requests reduces the chances that a policeman will unjustifiably invade someone's privacy).
'35
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
136 The Court later modified Fuentes in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974), permitting ex parte hearings in place of pre-seizure hearings if the creditor can
prove that the ex Parte hearings conform with constitutional due process requirements.
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tive cost, 13 7 due process requires a hearing in order to decrease the

risk of an arbitrary taking.'5 8 Fuentes, however, recognized an exception to the hearing requirement when three conditions are met: the
state controls the force being used, a very important government
interest is at stake, and there is a need for "very prompt action."' 13 9
It was the Fuentes construction of the due process clause, rather
than the fourth amendment warrant requirement, that the Court addressed when it first confronted the pre-seizure hearings problem in
a forfeiture case. The Court concluded in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co. 140 that the Puerto Rican government met the three
Fuentes conditions when it seized a yacht under its drug laws without
a pre-seizure hearing. The forfeiture was acceptable: the Commonwealth had control over the force used; the desire to stop the continued illicit use of property represented a significant government
purpose; and the Commonwealth needed to act quickly to prevent
the owner from taking the yacht to another jurisdiction.' 4 1 The
Court also noted that the Commonwealth officials performed the
same function that ajudge would perform since the statute required
the Commonwealth officials to determine whether the seizure was
142
appropriate before taking possession of the property.
Lower courts have construed the Calero-Toledo holding to be a
per se rule validating forfeitures whenever the property is relatively
mobile.1 4 3 The Court's heavy-handed treatment of the facts of the
case may have caused this construction.' 4 4 The lower courts' per se
rule, however, is unwise because its broad sweep could subvert the
fourth amendment and the due process clause by allowing the Fuentes exception to swallow the general rule requiring pre-seizure hearings. The fourth amendment turns on reasonableness, which
should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis 14 5 and not with bright
Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90.
ideat 83.
Id. at 91. The third Fuentes exception may be identical to the exigent circumstances requirement for warrantless searches. See infra note 148.
140
416 U.S. 663 (1974).
137
138
139

141

Id. at 679.

142

Id.

See, e.g., United States v. Certain Real Estate Property, 612 F. Supp. 1492, 1496
(S.D. Fla. 1985). Some courts have even broadened the law to validate all forfeiture
seizures regardless of how immovable the property is. See, e.g., United States v. A Single
Family Residence, 803 F.2d 625, 632 (11 ith
Cir. 1986).
144 The dissent in Calero-Toledo criticized the Court for basing its holding on facts
which were more germane t6 forfeiture actions and yachts in general than to the facts
before the Court. For instance theyacht was seized over two months after the marijuana
was spotted on board, so there was no need for very prompt action. Calero-Toledo, 416
U.S. at 691 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
145
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13, 16-20 (1968) (the variety of types of street
encounters between the police and citizens has led the Court to conclude that case-bycase review is best).
143
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line rules. Although most yacht seizures will be reasonable, 14 6 it is
not difficult to imagine one that is unreasonable and thus violates
the fourth amendment.' 4 7 The constitutional need to avoid these
unreasonable seizures should require an adequate pre-seizure hearing through the warrant process in every case where no exigent circumstances exist.' 4 8 In these hearings a judge should require the
government to demonstrate probable cause before it can seize a
vessel.
The lower courts' interpretation of Calero-Toledo's holding does
not resolve the constitutionality of the admiralty rules. The Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims are not
limited to ships and boats. In fact, the rules recognize that the
seizure can occur on land. 4 9 Thus, a government officer can file the
complaint with a clerk, the clerk must issue a warrant, and then the
government can seize any property under the admiralty rules, including realty.1 50 The government, however, would have a difficult
time meeting the third Fuentes condition-the need for "very prompt
action"-when the government seizes realty or other non-mobile
property. If the seizure fails to meet the three Fuentes conditions
then the seizure is constitutional only if there is a pre-seizure
hearing.
In a recent opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that claimants are entitled to pre-seizure hearings when the
government attempts to seize stationary items such as realty.' 5 1 The
court held that as a general rule, it is "unlikely" that the government
146 If there is probable cause, most seizures will be reasonable and a warrant will be
unnecessary. Because yachts are very mobile and can easily move to avoid seizure, most
seizures will fit within the exigent circumstances exception. See infra note 148.
147
One instance where the government would have a very difficult time proving
exigent circumstances would be a situation similar to that in Calero-Toledo. Evidently the
illegal incident which caused the forfeiture occurred two months prior to the seizure.
Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 691 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Because there was a two month
delay between the illegal incident and the seizure, the Commonwealth officials had
plenty of time to seek a warrant, making it difficult for the Commonwealth to allege the
existence of exigent circumstances. If the government has sufficient time in which to
obtain a warrant, a delay creates an inference that there are no exigent circumstances.
See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 215 (1981); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 470 (1971); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 773 (1969); United States
v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1161 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1061 (1985).
148
The Court in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), indicated that exigent circumstances fall into three categories: where there is danger to the police officers
which justifies the search, where the evidence may lose its evidentiary value if it is not
obtained immediately, and where there is some threat of escape. Id. at 4.
149
FED. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. ADMIR. & MAR. CLAIMS C(2) ("the complaint shall state
the place of seizure and whether it was on land").
150
See, e.g., United States v. Certain Real Estate Property, 612 F. Supp. 1492 (S.D.
Fla. 1985).
151 United States v. Premises and Real Property at 4492 S. Livonia Rd., 889 F.2d
1258 (2d Cir. 1989).
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could show exigent circumstances when realty is involved because
realty is not "readily moved or dissipated."'15 2 Furthermore, the
government's interest in avoiding a pre-seizure hearing is weak.
The only interest is the reduced administrative burden of avoiding a
hearing before seizing the home. "[Tihe broad interest of enforcing
the drug laws is not applicable, because that interest is equally
15
served by forfeiture after an adversary proceeding." 3
A seizure under the admiralty provisions has an additional constitutional flaw. To commence a seizure under Rule C of the Supplemental Rules, the government must file a complaint with a clerk.
If the government has sufficient time to file a complaint with a clerk,
the government has sufficient time to obtain a warrant through a
probable cause hearing. Whenever the government initiates a
seizure with a complaint, the government can have neither exigent
circumstances nor a need for prompt action. Thus, the admiralty
rules are only constitutional to the extent that they conform to the
Due Process and the Fourth Amendment Seizure Clauses.
(iii)

The Probable Cause Exception to the Statutory Seizure
Mechanism Is Constitutionally Flawed

Like the admiralty mechanism for forfeiture, the alternative
statutory mechanism is constitutionally flawed. Section 881(b)(1)(4) provides four statutory mechanisms for initiating seizures. The
mechanism that applies most aptly to drug forfeitures, section
881(b)(4), merely requires the Attorney General to have probable
cause to believe that the property is subject to civil forfeiture. This
mechanism requires neither a warrant nor the presence of one of
the exceptions to the warrant requirement 154 in order to initiate the
forfeiture.
To save the statute from constitutional attack, the courts must
read into the statute a warrant requirement or a requirement that
one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement be
present in order to initiate a forfeiture. 155 Both the First and the
Ninth Circuits have actually taken this initiative and have read a requirement of exigent circumstances into the statute after holding
that Congress cannot legislate a seizure provision that is contrary to
Id. at 1258.
Id.
E.g., exigent circumstances. See supra note 148.
Courts should invoke the familiar canon of statutory construction of interpreting
statutes to conform to constitutional requirements. See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-inthe Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 814-15 (1983). The
logic behind this canon is that the object of statutory construction is to give meaning to
the intent of the legislature, and presumably the legislature intends to enact law that is
constitutional.
152

153
154
155
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the fourth amendment warrant requirement.1 56 The circuits, however, are far from unanimous. The Third, Fourth and Fifth Circuits
have construed the statute literally, holding that the seizure can be
57
warrantless even if there are no exigent circumstances.1
The Third Circuit expressly rejected the First Circuit's reasoning, concluding that exigent circumstances are not required because
the fourth amendment does not apply to civil forfeiture actions.' 58
The Third Circuit's analysis, however, turns on a faulty premise.
The court reasoned that the fourth amendment does not apply to
forfeiture actions because forfeitures are actions in rem and objects
do not have privacy expectations. The court cites its own precedent
in support of this proposition.' 59 This precedent, however, had
been overruled by a later Supreme Court holding that forfeiture actions are subject to fourth amendment limitations.' 60 Thus, the
Third Circuit erroneously concluded that forfeitures are not bound
by the fourth amendment, and consequently held that as Congress
had deliberately chosen not to require exigent circumstances in forfeiture actions, this intent should be followed.
The Fourth Circuit took an innovative approach to this question in United States v. Kemp. 16 1 Because forfeiture theoretically occurs the moment the vehicle is used illegally, 162 the court held that
the seizure merely recovered "property [which] belong[ed] to the
United States."' 6 3 Therefore, the court held that the government
did not invade any "legitimate expectations of privacy" because the
property does not belong to the defendant. 64
The Fourth Circuit's analysis effectively denies fourth amendment protections to forfeiture claimants and thereby sidesteps the
Supreme Court's holding in One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania 16 5 that such actions are subject to the amendment.
Although a drug smuggler might finance the purchase of a house
156 See United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1465 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Pappas, 613 F.2d 324, 327 (Ist Cir. 1979). But see In re Warrant to Seize One 1988
Chevrolet Monte Carlo, 861 F.2d 307, 311 n.4 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that Pappas has

been criticized, and suggesting that its vitality may be questioned in the future).
157 See United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, Four Door Sedan, 711 F.2d 1297,
1302 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397, 401-02 (4th Cir. 1982);
United States v. One 1977 Lincoln Mark V Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 157 (3d Cir.), cert.

denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981).
158 One 1977 Lincoln Mark V Coupe, 643 F.2d at 157.
159 Id. at 158 (citing United States v. $1,058 in United States Currency, 323 F.2d
211, 213 (3d Cir. 1963)).
160 See One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 697 (1964).
161 690 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1982).
162 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(h) (West Supp. 1989).
163 Kemp, 690 F.2d at 401.
164 Id.
165 380 U.S. 693 (1964).
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with drug money, one would hope that few courts would allow the
police to seize the house and its contents without a valid warrant.
Furthermore, evidence found in a house so seized would be inadmissable in court. 16 6 Kemp's holding, however, implies that the
seizure would be acceptable because under the forfeiture laws, the
house belongs to the government.. The drug smuggler could have
no subjective, nor objectively reasonable, expectation of privacy in a
government dwelling. This example points out the deficiency in
Kemp's holding. Kemp assumes that the fourth amendment protects
places and not people. The Supreme Court, however, held the opposite in Katz v. United States, 167 a non-forfeiture case. The Court
reasoned that the fourth amendment protects those things which a
person reasonably expects to be private.' 68 Thus, if claimants reasonably expected their vehicles or houses to be private, the fourth
1 69
amendment would protect those expectations.
To make Section 881's statutory seizure mechanism conform to
the fourth amendment, courts must read an exigent circumstances
requirement into the statute. The statute currently allows the government to seize property as long as it has probable cause to believe
the property is subject to civil forfeiture. Although a literal reading
of the statute may not require the agent to have exigent circumstances for making the seizure, such a reading violates the constitutional warrant requirement.
3.

It Is Unclear Whether Claimants Are Entitled to Eighth
Amendment Protections

The eighth amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."' 7 0 This prohibition limits the government's
power in criminal settings.' 7 ' Perhaps because most courts view
forfeitures as quasi-criminal actions, no court of record has yet to
interpret forfeitures in light of the eighth amendment.' 7 2 If we ac166 See United States v. Real Property Located at 25231 Mammoth Circle, 659 F.
Supp. 925, 927 (C.D. Cal. 1987); United States v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 647 F. Supp. 732,
741 (W.D.N.C. 1986); United States v. Certain Real Estate Property, 612 F. Supp. 1492,
1498 (S.D. Fla. 1985).
167 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (the fourth amendment protects "people [and] not
places").

168

Id.

The Fifth Circuit has adopted the rationale of the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Kemp. United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, Four Door Sedan, 711 F.2d 1297,
1302 (5th Cir. 1983).
170
U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
171
See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288-91 (1983).
169

172

See id.
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cept 21 U.S.C. § 881 as a criminal statute, however, then it must
conform to the requirements of the eighth amendment.
An eighth amendment analysis begins by determining if the
statute requires bail, imposes a fine, or inflicts a punishment. The
only penalty that Section 881 imposes is the forfeiture of property.
Forfeiture is the functional equivalent of a fine 17 and it can be
viewed as a monetary loss to the claimant. 17 4
The second step in an eighth amendment analysis is to determine if the fine is excessive. The Supreme Court held in Solem v.
Helm 175 that a fine or a punishment is unconstitutionally excessive if
it is disproportionate to the underlying conduct. 176 The Court in
Helm ordered the state of South Dakota to resentence a repeat
offender who had been sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of parole for eight relatively minor felonies. 17 7 The Court mandated that courts compare the punishment to the severity of the
crime, as well as to the sentences imposed upon others with similar
records in the same and in other jurisdictions. 178 The Court rejected the idea that the eighth amendment is solely a restraint on
torture and the death penalty. In so holding, the Court stated that
"a criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which
the defendant has been convicted .... [N]o penalty is per se constitutional .... [A] single day in prison may be unconstitutional in
79
some circumstances."'
Helm has clear implications for the constitutionality of Section
881. In determining if the punishment is excessive, a court following
Helm initially performs a proportionality review by comparing the
severity of the crime to the severity of the punishment. With respect
to the eighth amendment proportionality requirement, Section 881
should run afoul of the constitution whenever an individual forfeits
extremely valuable property for the possession of a small amount of
drugs. Such unconstitutional forfeitures are likely under the zero
tolerance policy and should be rejected by the courts.
Helm considered an additional factor in its evaluation of excessive punishment. The Court compared the punishment of the defendant to the punishment of similarly situated defendants in the
173 BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 595 (5th ed. 1979) (defines a fine to include civil
forfeitures).
174 Furthermore, the claimant can repurchase the property from the government.
19 U.S.C.A. § 1614 (West Supp. 1989).
175 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
176 Id. at 285-86.
177

Id. at 279-82.

178

Id. at 291-92.

179

Id. at 290.
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same and in other jurisdictions.1 8 0 The Court seemingly elevated

the goal of treating similar cases alike to a constitutional requirement. However, the very nature of forfeiture laws prevents like
cases from being treated similarly. The penalty in Section 881 is not
linked to the nature of the underlying action, but is tied to the value

of the property; two individuals with the same amount of drugs will
be treated alike only if they fortuitously forfeit property with identical values.
It is not clear, however, that under Helm a court would strike
down a forfeiture because it is disproportionate. Only three times
has the Court struck down sentences (excluding death penalties) for
violating the eighth amendment. 1 8 ' But the Court's reluctance to
strike down prison sentences on eighth amendment grounds should
not control its action in regard to disproportionate forfeitures. The
eighth amendment does not clearly prohibit disproportionate
prison sentences. Only that punishment which is so disproportion82
ate as to be "cruel and unusual" is prohibited by the amendment.1
By contrast, it is not necessary to strain the language of the amendment to strike down disproportionate forfeitures; the amendment
8
specifically prohibits "excessive fines."'
Helm's eighth amendment proportionality requirement is applicable to forfeitures for a second reason. The Court seems anxious
to defer to the legislative branch's determination that a punishment
is suited to the crime.' 8 4 With forfeiture, however, there is no such
determination. The legislature cannot determine that the forfeiture
is proportional to the underlying activity because the degree of punishment is connected solely to the value of the property seized.
Even if there was a legislative intent connecting any given punishment with any given activity, it should be even less controlling on
the courts when we consider a case arising under the zero tolerance
policy. Zero tolerance shifts the focus of the law from an attack on
drug suppliers, like Congress envisioned, to an attack on drug
users.' 8 5 It therefore does not appear that Congress intended Section 881 to sanction very disproportionate seizures because Congress envisioned that most seizures would penalize drug smugglers,
whose conduct is more culpable than that of drug users. Courts
180

Id. at 291-92.

181 Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (life imprisonment without parole); Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660 (1962) (10-day jail sentence for being addicted to narcotics); Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (20 years in chains performing hard labor combined
with the loss of assorted rights of citizenship).
182 Helm, 463 U.S. at 304-18 (1983) (Burger, J., dissenting).
183

U.S. CoNsr. amend. VIII.

184
185

See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274, 283-84 (1980).
See supra notes 6-12, 35-40 and accompanying text.
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should therefore apply the Helm test to forfeitures, and strike down
grossly disproportionate applications of Section 881 as a violation
of the eighth amendment.
III
THE DRUG FORFEITURE LAWS VIOLATE FUNDAMENTAL

NOTIONS OF FAIRNESS
Fairness is one of the goals of the judicial system.' 8 6 The system, however, does not always achieve this goal. Section 881 is unfair: it imposes severe penalties for minimal amounts of drugs; it
places an unreasonably high affirmative duty on owners to police
those who use their vehicles; it does not permit courts to ameliorate
harsh results; and the laches defense does not apply against the
United States government.
A.

Vessels Should Not Be Forfeit for Carrying Small
Quantities of Drugs

Section 881 does not require proof of drug smuggling or the
presence of a minimum amount of drugs in order to initiate a forfeiture.18 7 This is paradoxical in light of the Section's legislative history, which indicates that Congress intended to attack large scale
drug traffickers. 18 8 One possible explanation for this paradox is that
Congress designed the law to facilitate prosecution of large scale
drug traffickers, even when the traffickers were found carrying only
small quantities of drugs. Likewise, Congress may have thought
that such line drawing was unnecessary because the judicial system
does not ordinarily have either the capacity or the desire to prosecute personal users. 18 9
Despite this legislative history, the courts have been fairly unanimous in concluding that they should follow the broad language of
the statute even in cases involving personal users. 190 The courts
have not struck down forfeitures where the police have only found
small quantities of drugs. For example, the First Circuit has simply
refused to read a minimum amount into the statute. 19 1 The Ninth
See generally John Rawls,Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164 (1958).
21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a) (West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
188 See supra notes 3540 and accompanying text.
189
Rangel, supra note 2.
190 See United States v. One 1976 Porsche 911S, 670 F.2d 810 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. One Clipper Bow Ketch NISKU, 548 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1977); United
States v. One 1973 Dodge Van, 416 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Mich. 1976); United States v. One
1973 Pontiac Grand Am, 413 F. Supp. 163 (W.D. Tex. 1976); United States v. One 1971
Porsche Coupe Auto., 364 F. Supp. 745 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
186
187

191
United States v. One Clipper Bow Ketch NISKU, 548 F.2d 8, 11-12 (Ist Cir.
1977).
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Circuit went further by expressly rejecting the resort to legislative
192
history, claiming that the statute is clear on its face.
Courts should not allow forfeitures when the government finds
only small quantities of drugs unless the prosecution can link the
owner to drug trafficking. Reading the statute to cover more conduct than Congress intended is unjustified judicial activism. If the
statute were construed as criminal in nature, such applications
would be invalid because courts must interpret criminal statutes
strictly to avoid notice problems.193 Even if the statute is civil, a
standard rule of statutory construction requires courts to read statutes expansively only when the statutes are remedial. 194 Congress,
however, has specifically recognized that 21 U.S.C. § 881 is not remedial but punitive, 19 5 and therefore the courts should not give the
statute an expansive reading.' 9 6 The courts should read the statute
to be no broader than the implied congressional intent.
The second reason for limiting forfeiture to drug traffickers is
that laws which target the users of small quantities of drugs are selectively and arbitrarily enforced.' 97 One study, after it controlled
for the amount of marijuana regularly used, found a higher arrest
rates for possession of marijuana when the defendant was young,
blue collar, active in the counter-culture, and non-white than when
the user was older, white collar, within the mainstream culture, and
white.' 98 Discriminatory or selective enforcement is inherent with
any law that is widely violated, because the police cannot arrest
every violator. 199 An increase in police discretion results in the police having more power to make unreviewable decisions. 20 0 In an
ideal criminal justice system, police discretion is minimized so that
policy choices can be made by judges and legislators rather than by
individual officers. 2 0 1 The strong constitutional overtones of any
seizure mandate that the system strive to reduce police discretion.
B.

The Innocent Owner Defense Should Be Expanded
Section 881 creates two exceptions to the general forfeiture

192

193
194
195
196

1986).

United States v. One 1976 Porsche 911S, 670 F.2d 810, 812 (9th Cir. 1979).
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347-48 (1971).
In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J.).
See supra note 96.
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRiMiNAL LAW 77 n.23 (2d ed.

197 James F. Mosher, DiscriminatoryPracticesin MarijuanaArrests: Results from a National
Survey of Young Men, 9 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 85, 101 (1980).
198 id at 94, 98.
199 Cf Smith v. Gogven, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974) (language of flag statute so broad
as to invite enforcement officials to pursue "personal predilections").
200
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
201 ld
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rule: first, when the vessel is stolen, and second, when the vessel is a
common carrier and the owner was unaware of the presence of
drugs. 20 2 In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. ,203 the Supreme
Court created a third "innocent owner" defense available to any
owner who can prove that he took all reasonable precautions to
20 4
keep the vessel drug-free.
The innocent owner exceptions, however, are not sufficient to
remedy the harshness of forfeiture laws. The two statutory exceptions are rarely applicable because they are so narrow. 20 5 And the
Calero-Toledo defense is difficult to meet. Owners who prove that
they have taken reasonable precautions will not succeed in reclaiming their property. Instead, owners must prove that they have
taken all reasonable precautions; this requirement imposes a stan20 6
dard of proof capable of harsh application.
The courts should expand the innocent owner defense to allow
all owners to recover their property if the government cannot prove
that the owner is linked to the illegal drugs. Owners should not
forfeit their property for failing to act as a private police force which
searches every person who borrows, leases, or is invited into the
vehicle. Traditionally, Anglo-American criminal law has not placed
such affirmative duties on individuals. 20 7 It is unfair to impose vicarious liability in criminal contexts, especially because it could lend
to countless intrusions on individual privacy. There is a strongly
distasteful Orwellian overtone to the idea of overzealous individuals
watching each other in order to safeguard against criminal activities.
C.

Courts Should Examine the Equities of Every Forfeiture
A claimant seeking to recover forfeited property must apply for

21 U.S.C.A. § 881(a)(4)(A)-(B) (West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
416 U.S. 663 (1974).
204
Id. at 685-86.
205
See, e.g., United States v. One Mercedes Benz 380 SEL, 604 F. Supp. 1307
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), aft'd, 762 F.2d 991 (2d Cir. 1985) (use of a car without owner's knowledge or consent is not enough to invoke stolen vehicle exception).
206 An example of how stringently the courts can apply this standard is United States
v. One 1957 Rockwell Aero Commander 680 Aircraft, 671 F.2d 414 (10th Cir. 1982).
The court of appeals held that a plane used in a drug running operation was forfeit. The
court rejected the owner's innocent owner defense when it concluded that the owner
acted negligently. Id at 418. The owner took possession of the plane as collateral for a
defaulted loan, but never actually picked up the plane. Id at 415-16. It sat in a hangar
until someone used it for a drug run, and abandoned it. Id. at 415, 418. The owner
could not prove that the plane was stolen, but there was no suggestion of collusion
between the owner of the plane and the drug runner. The court decided that the owner
was negligent in not picking up the plane and placing it in a more secure hangar. Therefore, he did not take all reasonable precautions, and the plane was forfeit. Id at 418.
207
Cf H.L.A. Hart, Variety of Responsibility, 83 LAw Q. REv. 346, 354-55 (1967).
202

203
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remission. 20 The effectiveness of such application, however, is
questionable. The courts have held that, with the exception of a few
limited defenses, the only available leniency lies within the Attorney
General's discretion. 20 9 As it is not possible to appeal the Attorney
General's denial of remission, 21 0 the claimant has limited recourse.
To bypass the strictness of the law, the courts have resorted to numerous defenses. The most frequently applied exception is the innocent owner defense. 2 11 Courts apply another exception for bona
fide purchasers for value. 2 12 The typical exception, however, seems
to be a reaction to the inequities of the particular case before the
2 13
court and is seldom applied in other cases.
If the courts could review the Attorney General's denial of the
remission request, then the courts would not feel compelled to create questionable loopholes. It would be better for Congress to create one exception which allows the courts to determine the equities
of the forfeiture, and for Congress to suggest an illustrative list of
the criteria for evaluating the equities. Such a statutory system
would be superior to the present system, in which identical cases are
often not treated identically. Vast discrepancies occur when the
only variable seems to be the degree to which the judge feels committed to enforcing the strict terms of the statute.
D.

The Defense of Laches Does Not Apply Against the United
States
The Supreme Court held in Costello v. United States 2 14 that the

208
19 U.S.C.A. § 1618 (West 1981 & Supp. 1989) (procedure for remission or mitigation of penalties); 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(d) (West Supp. 1989) (modifying § 1618 by replacing customs officials with the Attorney General). See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
209 United States v. One Clipper Bow Ketch NISKU, 548 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1977).
210 United States v. One 1973 Buick Riviera Auto., 560 F.2d 897, 900 (8th Cir.
1977).
211 See supra text accompanying notes 203-04.
212
See United States v. One 1976 Chevrolet Corvette, 477 F. Supp. 32, 34 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (claimant's defense to forfeiture valid because she was not involved in wrongful
activities and activities took place before her purchase); cf United States v. One Parcel of
Real Estate Property, 660 F. Supp. 483 (S.D. Miss.) (forfeiture valid where purchaser
knew property was being used in smuggling operations), aff'd, 831 F.2d 566 (5th Cir.
1987).
213
One example of a seemingly ad hoc exception is when the government fails to
prove a sufficient nexus between the forfeited vehicle and a violation of the drug laws.
See United States v. $38,600.00 in United States Currency, 784 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1986);
United States v. One 1976 Ford F-150 Pick-up, 769 F.2d 525 (8th Cir. 1985). Another
exception is where the forfeiture fails to advance the public policy behind the law because the owner was innocent of wrongdoing but was unable to meet the "all reasonable
steps" requirement. See United States v. One 1979 Datsun 280 ZX, 720 F.2d 543 (8th
Cir. 1983).
214
365 U.S. 265 (1961).
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defense of laches 21 5- does not apply against the United States. 2 16
The Court reasoned that on public policy grounds laches would not
preserve public rights, property, and revenues from injury caused
by the negligence of public officers. The implication for forfeitures
is that the government may retrieve property years after the claimant used it illegally. This rule allowing government delay of seizure,
coupled with the rule that property is considered to be forfeit the
moment it is used in violation of the drug laws, 2 17 results in the defendant not being allowed to claim that the government has slept on
its rights. 2 18 One odd implication is that the government conceivably could bring an action for rent or waste for the time that it allowed the property to remain in the possession of the claimant after
it was forfeited. A second implication is that there are a lot of late
1960s V.W. micro-buses being driven to Grateful Dead shows that
are actually owned by the government.
CONCLUSION

The drug forfeiture laws violate both the Constitution and fundamental notions of fairness. The constitutional infirmities stem
from the quasi-criminal status of Section 881. The unfairness stems
from Congress's failure to limit the applications of Section 881, allowing it to be applied inequitably. It is possible to remedy these
flaws.
The constitutional flaws can be remedied by making several
changes in the law. The Court should recognize that forfeiture is a
criminal penalty and that claimants therefore are entitled to criminal
due process protections. Currently, the statute violates the Constitution because the government need not prove all the necessary elements of the offense, the claimants can be subject to ex post facto
laws and double jeopardy, the claimant is not always entitled to a
jury of his or her peers, the claimant is not given all the necessary
fourth amendment protections, and the penalty is frequently disproportional to the underlying offense.
The courts can remedy most of the defects through their power
to interpret the statute. In the alternative, the courts can strike
down the statute, requiring Congressional reformation. If Congress
were to re-enact the statute, it should require the government to
prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt when
a claimant challenges the forfeiture. At a minimum, the government
should prove that the owner had scienter and that the property
215
216
217
218

Laches is a equitable time bar defense penalizing those who sleep on their rights.
Costello, 365 U.S. at 281.
21 U.S.C.A. § 881(h) (West Supp. 1989).
United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397, 402 (4th Cir. 1982).
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seized is connected to illegal drugs. Additionally, Congress should
limit forfeiture to those cases where the government finds a large
quantity of drugs or where the government can prove that the
owner or lessor of the forfeited property is a distributor of drugs
and that the forfeited property is substantially connected to this distribution. The third necessary revision is to conform the statutory
mechanisms of Section 881 to reflect fourth amendment requirements. The admiralty mechanism should require a judicially approved warrant; the statutory forfeiture mechanism should permit
warrantless searches only if the government has both probable
cause and exigent circumstance.
Such revisions to Section 881 would cure not only its constitutional defects, but also remedy some of its fairness problems. If the
government is required to institute forfeiture only when either the
government finds a large quantity of drugs or when the property is
substantially connected to the distribution of drugs, the proportionality concerns will be remedied. This revision would also cure the
concern over placing a burdensome affirmative duty upon the owner
of the property to inspect for drugs. The remainder of the fairness
concerns would be met if Congress allowed courts to review the Attorney General's denial of remission, or allowed courts the power to
conduct a de novo review.
Stopping the use of drugs that contribute to the destruction of
our inner cities is obviously a high priority. But the solution to this
problem should not come at the expense of constitutional rights,
nor should it impose an unreasonably high burden on those unfortunate enough to be snared within a net, too widely cast.
Michael Schecter

